

THE ROLE OF SECURITY CULTURE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST FAKE NEWS

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Abstract: *The present paper aims at investigating the role that a strong security culture can play in the fight against fake news. Fake news are designed to target the stability of the security environment of different public actors, be they statal, organizational, social, economic, etc. The question the researchers attempt to answer is whether or not a well-developed and firm security culture can prevent fake news from reaching its goal and destabilizing the security environment. Consequently, the researchers will investigate what security culture is at the beginning of the 21st century, what effects fake news can have on society and to what extent a mature security culture can diminish the impact of fake news. The analysis will be based on the answers to a questionnaire that the researchers developed and applied on a target group of 295 respondents and that was designed to measure the degree of interconnectivity between a mature, well-developed security culture and an understanding of how fake news functions and how it can be thwarted.*

Keywords: *security culture; fake news; security interests; assessment of accuracy; disinformation*

1. INTRODUCTION

The problem of fake news has become increasingly contentious, widespread and hard to tackle in recent years and it has been proven to have affected elections in several democratic states, to have fostered the spread of nationalist and populist ideologies, to have subverted the values of liberalism and to have introduced many countries to illiberal challenges. Many researchers and specialists have focused on identifying and understanding the underlying mechanisms that make fake news such an effective tool in upending social stability and the *status quo*. However, even if better understood at present, fake news has of yet not been countered efficiently. The best ways to do so at present seem to be, on the one hand, education, under many guises and focusing on many aspects from media literacy, to critical thinking to a more structured approach to historical studies and, on the other hand, resilience building, namely using positive narratives to support and promote the very values that fake news attempts to subvert. In this context, we propose a study on the role that security culture can play in thwarting fake news. Our endeavor stems from the second category of measures that could be taken against fake news but it is also rooted in education, as only through education can one achieve a clearer understanding of what security is and how it can be

fostered. Our research firstly aims to pinpoint what security culture is more precisely not in a military, but in a societal context and how it can be built. Secondly, we shall present a synthesis of why fake news is efficient as a destabilizing force in order to see to what extent a stable and mature security culture can counter the projected effects of targeted fake news. Thirdly we shall analyze the results to a questionnaire that was designed to measure the participants' level of security culture and their understanding of how fake news operates in order to determine whether or not security culture can raise the level of awareness as to the effects of fake news

2. SECURITY CULTURE: WHAT, WHY AND HOW

Culture is a system of values, practices, behaviors and aspirations which have been proven useful over time for certain communities and societies. As Fisher explains, "culture is a pretested design, a store of knowledge that has been crafted by humans who have gone before, a design that has been socially created, tested, and shared, and one that can be transmitted to the child." (Fisher, 1997: 44) Culture is learned and shared behavior, which systematizes the way in which things are done for the benefit of the community or society as a whole. As such, culture is also a mechanism of social

integration; however, in this respect, one other result of belonging to a certain culture needs to be taken into account. As it is based on mental habits and patterns, culture fosters the development of what Fisher calls “cultural lens” (Fisher, 1997:42), which colors, meaning shapes, the way in which members of a certain community or society reason, perceive, and even think about certain issues.

Security is the aggregate of individual and social representations according to which members of a society can carry out their activities freely and free from obvious threats, protected from dangers and trusting in future progress. Security entails the long-term stability of economic, political systems, individual prosperity and cohesive social relationships.

In this context, a definition of security culture arises. It is the result of social interactions which take place in groups, organizations, communities, societies preoccupied with the aspects of social security, with certain learning processes and knowledge acquisition processes in accordance with the individuals’ need for protection and safety. Security culture is adaptive and it is developed in relation to the evolution of society and it is shared from one generation to the next through various means of communication and through various emulative behaviors. The goal of security culture is to foster free human activity, to encourage progress and to help individuals develop the tools they need to become aware of possible threats and to respond to them appropriately.

Roer discusses security culture in an organizational context and proposes a set of elements that form and inform security: *policies*, *technology* and *people* (Roer, 2015:30). These three elements can be adapted to the larger context of a society’s security culture as follows. Policies are the reflection of the ideas, norms, customs that are particular to a certain culture and that have an impact on that society’s security. They may be formulated explicitly as laws or regulations or they may remain implicit. However, they are based on the culture the individuals share and want to uphold. These policies regulate all domains of public life: economy, education, healthcare, politics, justice, defense etc. Technology does not refer strictly to IT related items. It also refers to physical, virtual or mental infrastructures, to military equipment, to sanitation endowment, to educational facilities, in one word, to all the scientific and knowledge applications of a certain society. People are an important element of security culture because they produce, perceive and benefit from policies and technologies. They use the technology and they form and inform the

policies. Their culture determines the policies they adopt, the technology they develop. But their culture plays another important role: it helps people understand how their society functions, what can be improved and what they can do to ensure their progress. In a word, it is people who determine the degree of security they enjoy by the competence and knowledge they have to regulate through policies and to enforce and develop through technology.

Roer (2015: 44) explains that Social Learning Theory can be used to ascertain the processes that people use to learn and develop their own security culture. This process consists of four steps: *attention*, *retention*, *reproduction* and *motivation*. Of interest for our current endeavor are the first two steps since one way of determining the level of respondents’ security culture is to measure their attention to what is currently going on in society and their retention, meaning the extent to which they remember the information they hear and they adapt it to their level of interaction and knowledge. The questionnaire we designed measures the respondents’ knowledge of security culture as well as their perceptions regarding its promotion and efficiency in the public space. The second objective is to assess to what extent the respondents are aware of what fake news is and whether they have identified such news.

In order to measure the target group’s level of security culture, we designed several questions based on the concept of security interest, the lines of action, the main ways to ensure national security, and the list of national security interests as they are outlined in *The National Defense Strategy 2015-2019* (NDS). The list of interests tested is:

- guaranteeing the state’s national character, sovereignty, independence, unity and indivisibility;
- defending the country’s territorial integrity and inalienability;
- defending and consolidating constitutional democracy and the rule of law;
- protecting fundamental rights and liberties of all citizens and guaranteeing their safety;
- guaranteeing the right to preservation, development and expression of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of persons belonging to national minorities;
- capitalizing on our country’s resources and geostrategic position, in order to reach the welfare level that citizens are entitled to;
- reducing development disparities and the reconstruction of major public systems;

- ensuring the irreversible nature of belonging to the trans-Atlantic collective defense system
- consolidating the European Union and actively participating in integration processes within the Union. (NDS, 2015:8-9)
- To this list we added a few more:
- developing the necessary capabilities to react to hybrid threats (eg. cyberattacks)
- preventing and fighting tax evasion and other forms of economic and financial crime;
- guaranteeing the independence of the justice system;
- preventing and fighting terrorism;
- preparing institutions and the population for crisis situations.

These added interests reflect topics that have been highly debated in society in recent years and that revolve around issues which may pose threats to national security. The aim was to see to what extent the population views them as relevant for national security. The results will be discussed in section 3.

3. FAKE NEWS: WHY DOES IT WORK?

Fake news is a highly used and contested term nowadays that has become an umbrella term for any sort of information that is meant to alter the public's opinion on a certain issue. In this category fall: misinformation, disinformation, propaganda, blatant lies, half-truths, etc. It is important to notice from the very beginning that fake news is not the same as false news and the difference is quite relevant to the study of the effects that fake news has. False news presupposes that there is a truth that the news contradicts, goes against. Therefore, people can still find a point of certainty to refer to, a yardstick to measure the information against, their world perception is not completely distorted since the truth still exists even if a certain piece of information contradicts it. This is not true, however, of fake news. It is not simply false; it could be partially true, it could be valid in certain contexts, it reflects certain groups' values or beliefs while discrediting others. As the authors of *Fake News. A Roadmap* explain fake news aims to provoke a reaction in the audience and not necessarily communicate information or strategy (Allan et al., 2018: 8-9).

Fake news is most often associated with propaganda and disinformation. Voicu explains the difference between these two concepts. Propaganda is defined as “dissemination, using the mass media, of rumors, half-truths or even lies

without them necessarily being deception, while disinformation represents the effort of the enemy state to mislead the individuals, groups or governments with a view to influencing elites or public opinion” (Voicu, 2018:17) To sum up, propaganda may not necessarily be negative, opinion also supported by Barclay (2018: 330), while disinformation is always intentionally deceptive.

The question remains regarding the reasons why fake news has become so pervasive in contemporary society. The authors of *Fake News. A roadmap* explain that truth still matters at present. The debate, however, is over the fact that “what qualifies as a legitimate source of truth has been politicised.” (Allan *et al.*, 2018:13) Identifying a reliable source of information has become increasingly challenging at present, given the multitude of available information and also the ease with which this information can be cherry-picked to suit the interests of the communicator. O'Connor and Weatherall propose certain models that explain the way mainly scientific, but not only, information is spread from scientists and experts to the general public and to politicians. They make one very pertinent observation regarding the role that a propagandist can play in distorting this information. They notice that the propagandist does not need to produce fraudulent results.

Instead, by exerting influence on how legitimate, independent scientific results are shared with the public, the would-be propagandist can substantially affect the public's beliefs about scientific facts. This makes responding to propaganda particularly difficult. Merely sussing out industrial or political funding or influence in the production of science is not sufficient. We also need to be attuned to how science is publicized and shared (O'Connor & Weatherall, 2019:17).

The same idea can be taken over and applied to the field of security as Voicu explains. He stresses the fact that “fake news causes distortions in the social tissue of liberal democracies, as a symptom of populism” (Voicu, 2018:18). Authoritarian regimes rely on the media not to present events and facts but the lies that the state supports, to cause emotional responses, and given that this distorted information is repeated often enough, it becomes the new truth and it is widely accepted.

Another underlying reason that fake news functions so well in contemporary societies is the means available to disseminate it as well as the fact that the media is reliant on clicks in order to attract advertisers that finance their work. To take issues

separately, firstly, the advent and development of social media means that anybody, anywhere, irrespective of their qualifications can spread news, information for whatever purpose. As we shall see in section 3, in the analysis, the respondents have identified online sources as the most problematic, although they are also one of their primary means of finding out information. The mere volume of information that is available at any given moment on any given topic means that the public's ability to sort through it, to analyze and verify it is frayed to a maximum. And this situation is similar to all attempts of becoming informed, on all given days. The human cognitive system cannot process so much information and it becomes overloaded, which is why reliable sources of information are needed lest they should fall prey to propagandists' intentions. *Fake News. A roadmap* authors also notice that populist politicians who are identified as the most likely to employ fake news have often been accused of distorting facts and questioning "sources of information previously considered authoritative and trustworthy, i.e. the scientific community, journalists, and academics. This enables them to raise the legitimacy of their personalised, authentic standpoints. Listening to the voice of the expert would mean subjecting oneself to an imposed authority that goes against what the philosopher Isaiah Berlin back in 1967 identified as the "real populist ideology" of "unbroken", continuous plebiscite." (Allan *et al.*, 2018: 13) This idea is very relevant for the reason that fake news functions: if every person's opinion is equally important on any issue, regardless of their competence in the respective field, then there is no authority, and every user can create their own alternative truths and choose to align themselves with others whose beliefs are similar in echo chambers and filter bubbles. We can speak about opinions, beliefs and emotions driving society, rather than facts and knowledge.

Moreover, the media reflects the same trend as it can no longer be relied upon to present the truth. They need financing, which depends on the number of viewers or consumers they have.

The spreading of fake news [is a] highly strategic communicative approach that requires the actor to know his/her audience well and anticipate their reactions. Populist politics take this even further; it presents emotional and personal sources of truth as superior to knowledge gained from science, academic inquiry, or discussion (Allan *et al.*, 2018).

Appeals to emotion rather than reasoning elicit faster responses and, as O'Connor and Weatherall

point out, the novel and the unexpected that generate audience engagement are not always problematic, but these criteria can cause real troubles when they are applied to politics and economics. However,

the mere ability to broadcast information is not sufficient to create influence. You also need those to whom you are broadcasting to listen. And here we see the value of creating and distributing content through groups defined by a subject of shared interest or agreement (O'Connor & Weatherall, 2019:172).

And this is where propagandists come into action. O'Connor & Weatherall explain through scientific models how polarization works, how people end up being so completely separated, trapped in their respective echo chambers and filter bubbles, how his separation becomes so acute that societal links are on the verge of fracturing.

This means that establishing connections through affinity groups provides powerful tools for influence, especially when the influence tends to push them farther in directions they are already inclined to go. And if the purpose is merely to drive polarization—as opposed to persuading everyone of any particular claim—posing to people on both sides of an issue as someone who shares their opinions, and then presenting further evidence or arguments in support of those opinions, will be very successful (O'Connor & Weatherall, 2019: 172-173).

The same opinion is backed by Voicu who also stresses the fact that when referring to a strategic level, the implications are even direr, as

fake news campaigns are designed to sow distrust and confusion, to deepen social and cultural divides by using ethnic, racial and religious tensions (Voicu, 2018:18).

Emotions and the manipulation of emotions that stem from deep-rooted beliefs are the bedrock of how and why fake news functions.

To synthesize, fake news is aimed at creating societal tensions on all levels, depending of the disseminator's agenda. It can function as both propaganda as well as disinformation and it depends on a funds-reliant media that is on a quest to attract clicks as a means to fund itself. Emotions have been proven to provoke quicker and more dramatic reactions and engagements on the part of the audience. On the other hand, the audience is flooded with massive volumes of information and lacks credible sources of information which may

cause disengagement, distrust and confusion. The result of our questionnaire have proven that respondents feel the need to have the information market regulated to some extent, to have a system in place that flags and registers fake news. The result of our questionnaire will prove that respondents feel the need to have the information market regulated to some extent, to have a system in place that flags and registers fake news.

4. HOW RELEVANT IS SECURITY CULTURE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST FAKE NEWS?

The main purpose of our research was to investigate what determinations and correlations exist between security culture and fake-news. More specifically, our endeavor focused on the question whether a more robust and mature security culture can diminish the impact of fake news. This main purpose was performed through the following two objectives: (1) defining security culture fundamentals of the target group; and (2) defining the main approaches to fake news of the target group.

The questionnaire that helped accomplish the purpose consisted of 25 questions regarding security culture and fake news and it was administered in the period November 2018-January 2019, both in printed form and via an online Google forms.

The main target group was represented by persons that have an interest in the security and defense field due to their studies, to their professions, or to their research. 295 answers were collected, all from Romanian citizens, and they can be categorized as follows. According to age groups, 60.4% of respondents were young and very young belonging to the under 18 age group and the 18-35 age group. 39.6% fall into the 36-61 age group. The respondents' studies fall into the following categories: 14% secondary school graduates, 25.6% highschool graduates, 23.9% BA graduates, 28.7% are MA graduates, 6% doctoral and postdoctoral studies graduates, and the rest had graduated other types of programs (postgraduate, posthighschool etc.). With respect to professional status, 49% are public servants, 33.6% are not employed (pupils and students fall into this category), 13.4% are employed in private sector and the rest are in liberal professions or retired. According to gender, 45.9% of respondents are female and 54.1% are male. As we can see the group is steady having a balanced composition with heterogeneous slopes. That makes it perfect

for our research, by having the chance to compare and extend results.

Given their knowledge, three quarters (75.2%) of respondents correctly identified what a national security interest is, namely "the state's legitimate preoccupation and efforts to promote and defend the values that guarantee its existence, identity, development and stability". Given their understanding of what a security interest is, a little under two thirds of respondents (60%) stated that Romania's security interests are not correctly and coherently represented and promoted in the public space. Only 19% consider that the interests are correctly and coherently represented and promoted in the public space, while 21% do not know. This last number is also quite large, which may mean that these undecided have trouble correlating the information regarding security interests that they have to what they are exposed to in the public space or that they may have restraints regarding their own ability to interpret the promotion of security interests since this usually occurs at a larger scale, and may be hard to perceive by individuals. These results indicate the fact that only a fifth of respondents positively appreciate the way security interests are promoted and represented which may point to the fact that the interests are affected by controversial, incoherent, distorted or even fake information.

As far as Romania's security interests are concerned, the question focused on the importance given to a list of security interests for Romania and it required the respondents to rank them from 1 the least important to 10 the most important.

Table 1. Rank of goals of disseminating fake news

	Rank the following goals of disseminating fake news:	Average rank
a.	guaranteeing the state's national character, sovereignty, independence, unity and indivisibility	9.13
b.	defending the country's territorial integrity and inalienability	8.98
c.	defending and consolidating constitutional democracy and the rule of law	8.99
d.	reducing development disparities and the reconstruction of major public systems	8.14
e.	reconstructing great public infrastructures (healthcare, educational, transportation etc.)	8.67
f.	protecting fundamental rights and liberties of all citizens and guaranteeing their safety	8.96
g.	guaranteeing the right to preservation, development and expression of	7.39

	ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of persons belonging to national minorities	
h.	capitalizing on our country's resources and geostrategic position, in order to reach the welfare level that citizens are entitled to	8.23
i.	consolidating the European Union and actively participating in integration processes within the Union	7.86
j.	ensuring the irreversible nature of belonging to the trans-Atlantic collective defense system	8.80
k.	developing the necessary capabilities to react to hybrid threats (eg. cyberattacks)	8.76
l.	preventing and fighting tax evasion and other forms of economic and financial crime	8.44
m.	guaranteeing the independence of the justice system	8.73
n.	preventing and fighting terrorism	8.80
o.	preparing institutions and the population for crisis situations	8.74

The one deemed most important (9.13 average rank) was guaranteeing the national character, the sovereignty, independence, unity and indivisibility of the state. The interest that was considered least important (7.39 average rank) refers to guaranteeing the ethical, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities. This latter answer reflects the tensions that exist in Romania between the majority of the population and the ethnic groups. The former answer also shows the concerns that the respondents have with respect to existing threat to national integrity and the state's sovereignty. The interests that we added to the official list garnered as much support as the others, meaning that they are indeed perceived as important by the population.

Moving on to the way security interests are promoted and represented, a question focused on the news sources that the respondents considered most reliable.

Table 2. News sources

	What news sources do you trust most?	Percentage
a	Written press	29.5%
b	Television	36.6%
c	Radio	25.8%
d	Online press	39.7%
e	Social media (social networks, blogs, vlogs etc.)	17.6%
f	Another answer	5.1%

The first thing that can be noticed is that none of these sources of news is considered reliable by a majority of respondents, since none exceeds the 50% mark. The least unreliable is considered the online press, however, as research indicates, online press is also vulnerable to the dissemination of fake news, since the news appears in almost real time and with very few chances of being fact-checked properly. Moreover, once it is online, even if the news is not accurate, it can be shared multiple times before it can be corrected. Television remains an important source of news, however, it is surprising that the written press remains on the third place although, in recent years, many have prophesied the disappearance of written press with the advent of the Internet. Social media has gained notoriety as a tool for the dissemination of fake news as its rise has often been associated with the increase in fake news' reach and scope, as we have explained in section 2. Hence its placement as the least reliable source of news.

Using the vast theoretical pool of definitions and approaches to what fake news is we synthesized several aspects, considered most relevant and accessible to the public. Two of the characteristics of fake news stand out according to the responses, namely the fact that they influence people's opinions and that they disinform. The respondents are focused on the ways in which fake news could be used to affect security interests and destabilize society.

Table 3. Definition of the fake news

	What is fake news in your opinion?	Percentage
a	Fake news represents a new way of influencing people's opinions	83.4%
b	Fake news is the type of news that disinforms	70.8%
c	Fake news is used by certain organizations that have no other weapons	15.3%
d	Fake news is a myth	2.4%
e	Fake news is only entertainment	2.4%

In order to identify what the respondents consider to be the news sources which present contestable information (including fake news) we asked them to select those sources in which they identified such information.

Table 4. Sources of contestable information

	Which news sources did you identify contestable information in?	Percentage
a	Newspapers	35.6%
b	TV shows	80.3%

c	Radio shows	20.3%
d	Online news	67.1%
e	Social media	69.2%
f	I haven't discovered	2.7%
g	All of the above	0.7%

Mirroring and supporting the answers given to the previous question regarding the trustworthiness of news sources, respondents identify as most likely outlets for contestable information TV shows and social media. Online news trails closely behind social media as a vehicle for disseminating untrustworthy information. These answers confirm what the research has argued that the online environment is preferred medium for the dissemination of fake news, while TV shows have become more and more about presenting opinions that support the viewers' points of view than about the facts as they actually are.

We also asked respondents to rank according to importance the goals that the dissemination of fake news has from 1 the least important to 10 the most important.

Table 5. Goals of disseminating fake news

	Rank the following goals of disseminating fake news:	Average rank
a	Disinformation regarding certain economic measures	7.41
b	Disinformation regarding certain political measures	8.45
c	Disinformation regarding certain security measures	7.26
d	Disinformation regarding certain healthcare measures	6.84
e	Disinformation regarding certain environmental measures	6.36
f	Disinformation regarding certain educational measures	6.97
g	Disinformation regarding certain juridical measures	7.85
h	Distracting the public's attention from certain events	8.75
i	Creating misunderstanding among certain social categories (young/old people; working class/retirees etc.)	7.43
j	Diminishing the population's trust in the European Union	6.97
k	Diminishing the population's trust in NATO	6.69
l	Promoting the personal interests of certain public figures	8.19
m	Promoting the interests of certain multinational companies	7.43
n	Promoting the interests of certain countries	7.57
o	Influencing the results of democratic	7.59

	elections in certain countries	
p	Destabilizing democratic governments	7.29
r	Destabilizing authoritarian governments	6.65

As it can be seen, all the goals proposed, which were formulated based on an extensive literature review with respect to the aims of fake news and on observations pertaining to the public debates in Romania, have been ranked as being of above average importance by the respondents. The most important goal according to the respondents is to distract the public's attention from certain events, meaning that fake news is used as a red herring meant to refocus the debates in the public space on unrelated issues so that the important ones go unnoticed. The second ranking refers to fake news as a means of facilitating disinformation with respect to political events. This second ranking may be caused by the fact that politicians, under various guises (from using the term as such, to reference to the so-called deep state, to name just two), use the term fake news when talking about events that are not in consonance with their beliefs, actions or intentions. Thirdly, fake news is used, in our respondents' opinion to promote the interests of certain public figures. This ranking is linked to the previous one, meaning that is public figures use fake news to discredit contradictory opinions, voices or facts, and automatically their point of view becomes stronger. At the other end of the spectrum, the lowest ranking was obtained by fake news used to disinform the public with respect to environmental issues. There may be several reasons for this low ranking, of which the most important one being that the environment is not a priority in Romania, as public debates rarely focus on environmental issues.

Regarding the measures that could be taken to counter fake news ad disinformation, we provided the respondents with a list of the ones considered most effective in the literature and international programs.

Table 5. Efficient strategic actions in countering fake news dissemination

	Which of the following strategic actions do you consider would be most efficient in countering fake news dissemination and online disinformation?	Percent age
a	Developing the instruments to check online distributed information – online collaboration platforms among experts and citizens to identify fake news sources, to limit the circulation	69.5%

	of fake news and diminish their impact	
b	Sanctioning sources that post fake news	69.5%
c	Closing down sites that distribute fake news	49.2%
d	Suspending broadcasting licenses for media outlets that distribute fake news	48.5%
e	Media literacy – campaigns designed to educate the public regarding the evaluation of online distributed information and to increase active public participation in fighting online disinformation	82.4%
f	Developing methods for the public to easily signal a fake piece of news	48.5%
g	Developing public alert systems – providing real time data to the public regarding disinformation campaigns	34.9%
h	Signaling disinformation campaigns – indexing and labeling the sources that produce and distribute fake news, the media resources employed, the domains and the possible goals.	39.7%

The majority of respondents believe that media literacy is the most efficient means of combatting fake news and disinformation. However, this is a long term solution that will show its desired effects once a generation goes through school using a curriculum that includes such programs. When referring to short term solution, more than two thirds of respondents believe that developing instruments to check online information could be effective combined with sanctions applied to those sources that disseminate fake news. Drastic solutions that would come into conflict with the right to free speech only garnered about half of the respondents' acceptance. Thus, closing down sites and suspending broadcasting licenses are only seen as viable options by just under 50% of respondents, which leads us to an interesting conclusion: fake news might legitimize at one point censorship. The least efficient method, with only one third of respondents' appreciation is to develop public alert systems, which, coincidentally, is precisely the method that the European Union has decided to employ. On 18th March 2019 it released its Rapid Alert System whose goal is to inform citizens of fake news campaigns in real time.

5. CONCLUSIONS

We stated in this article that emotions have been proven to provoke quicker and more dramatic

reactions and engagements on the part of the audience. On the other hand, the audience is flooded with massive volumes of information. This blend of factors creates some powerful effects over regular people. Therefore, all persons must have a system in place that flags, compares and registers fake news. Returning to the main purpose of the article namely to investigate what determinations and correlations exist between security culture and fake-news, Pandora's box has been opened. By accomplishing the established objectives of the questionnaire, one can conclude that security culture can influence the impact of fake news, as security culture and the abilities to detect and identify fake news conditions each other. On the one hand, a security culture based on advanced knowledge, well-defined values that are shared by the members of a community or nation offers solid reference points and hard to shake moral values for the evaluation of distorted information which is disseminated in the public space. Moreover, security culture determines certain mental and actional patterns that allow for a critical analysis of the negative narratives meant to weaken the public's trust in the existing security architecture and for measures meant to diminish or even eliminate their negative impact. As it defines group, community, society identity, security culture ensures the bedrock for social cohesion around common objectives which inspire devotion, loyalty, cohesion, belonging, patriotism and these are, in fact, just as many barriers to protect against fake news and to enhance resilience to it.

On the other hand, long exposure to fake news can erode the foundation of security culture. Specific knowledge that ensures an understanding of security issues could become doubtful by use of extreme disinformation, the importance of values could be undermined and social attitudes could be altered by the promotion of populist or extremist ideas, concepts and models. Therefore, the respondents believe that media literacy, security education, tools to verify online news, institutions that regulate the media environment are all necessary to control the damage that fake news can cause in society.

The present article is only the first step in a new potential direction of research. More needs to be done in order to better understand how the influence of fake news could be contained. What this research proves is that a mature security culture entails the fact that it is easier for respondents to understand how fake news operates and what its effects could be and this is the first step towards resilience.

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